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OTHERING ACROSS BORDERS 
STEVEN ARRIGG KOH† 
ABSTRACT 
  Our contemporary moment of reckoning presents an opportunity to 
evaluate racial subordination and structural inequality throughout our 
three-tiered domestic, transnational, and international criminal law 
system. In particular, this Essay exposes a pernicious racial dynamic in 
contemporary U.S. global criminal justice policy, which I call othering 
across borders. First, this othering may occur when race emboldens 
political and prosecutorial actors to prosecute foreign defendants. Second, 
racial animus may undermine U.S. engagement with international criminal 
legal institutions, specifically the International Criminal Court. This Essay 
concludes with measures to mitigate such othering.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Brutal police killings, anti-Asian violence, and a global pandemic have 
forced race, criminal justice, and global affairs into our collective national 
consciousness. While long familiar to communities of color, the inequities 
of racially motivated violence are now broadly salient in the wake of the 
killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many others. Attacks on 
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders have cast a necessary national 
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spotlight on anti-Asian racism. Meanwhile, Covid-19 exposes global 
vulnerabilities: immunological, socioeconomic, political, and epistemic.  
This moment thus presents an opportunity to rigorously evaluate racial 
subordination and structural inequality at the intersection of race, criminal 
justice, and global affairs. Specifically, this Essay exposes a phenomenon I 
call othering across borders, wherein U.S. political actors perniciously 
promote domestic solidarity by prosecuting foreign defendants and 
sanctioning legal actors of color in international criminal legal institutions. 
By “othering,” I mean actions that the majority takes to promote in-group 
solidarity by exploiting a perception of the minority as different and inferior. 
While the concept of the “other” has emerged in various strains of 
intellectual thought over the past century,1 a broad synthesis consists of four 
Eurocentric propositions: (1) the other is a means of defining the self, (2) the 
other is an abstraction, (3) the other cannot define itself, and (4) the other is 
to be feared and controlled.2 As Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has noted, 
when non-stigmatized people create an “other,” it bonds their collective 
sense of identity, which they define in opposition to such other.3 In our 
domestic criminal conception, the majority may view the criminal defendant 
as a form of other, distinct from the polity and collective of “the People” in 
a prosecution.4 Othering is also evident in the disparate treatment of domestic 
and foreign terrorists in our criminal justice system.5  
 
 1.  See generally, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903) (discussing “double 
consciousness”); JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., Barbara Johnson 
trans., 1981) (discussing hierarchically ordered oppositional categories); SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE 
SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., 1952) (examining male subjugation of the female other); 
FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markman trans., 1967) (analyzing the 
colonially constructed inferiority complex); EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978) (considering 
Western perceptions of Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa). See also Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child 
as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 690–
99 (2002) (reviewing conceptions of “other” and applying them to juvenile justice). 
 2.  Nunn, supra note 1, at 698–99; see also, e.g., JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S 
MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY 68–72 (2009) (describing the othering and selective racialization of Middle 
Easterners). 
 3.  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1372 (1988). Social psychology has 
supported this theory. See Gordon Hodson, Victoria M. Esses & John F. Dovidio, Perceptions of Threat, 
National Representation, and Support for Procedures To Protect the National Group, in COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON TERRORISM 109, 109–25 (Paul 
R. Kimmel & Chris E. Stout eds., 2006).  
 4.  Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
249, 270–71 (2019). 
 5.  See generally Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and 
“International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333 (2019) (challenging the international-domestic 
terrorism divide and describing its deleterious consequences for Muslims); TEHRANIAN, supra note 2 
(describing the assault on the civil rights of Middle Eastern Americans in the wake of 9/11). 
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This Essay completes the picture of othering in U.S. criminal justice by 
exploring its extraterritorial dimensions. First, othering across borders 
occurs when race emboldens political and prosecutorial actors to prosecute 
foreign defendants. Such othering of communities of color may be even 
greater in the transnational context than in the domestic one, given that 
certain defendants and international criminal legal actors are both of color 
and lacking American citizenship. Second, race complicates U.S. 
engagement with international criminal legal institutions. Specifically, U.S. 
antagonism toward the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) may intensify 
when certain international criminal legal actors are nonwhite. This 
antagonism then further undermines the project of international criminal law 
(“ICL”) and, even more broadly, fragments international law itself. Along 
both of these dimensions, U.S. political and prosecutorial actors exploit such 
othering across borders to promote national solidarity and build domestic 
political capital.  
Up until now, scholars have primarily considered the role of race in 
three related criminal, foreign relations, and/or international legal contexts: 
(1) U.S. criminal justice, (2) U.S. national security policy, and (3) ICC 
prosecutorial discretion. First, numerous studies show how the modern 
American criminal justice system produces racially disparate outcomes in 
several areas, including policing and profiling, the drug war, the death 
penalty, prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, the school-to-prison 
pipeline, and incarceration.6 Second, twenty years after the 9/11 attacks, we 
have gained perspective on the function of race in national security,7 
including how the U.S. government has marginalized its own citizens—those 
who are already members of alienated minority groups, such as Arab and 
 
 6.  See generally, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017); MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) 
(positing that the criminal justice system, through the War on Drugs, has created a contemporary system 
of discrimination and oppression); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond 
the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012) (critiquing the Jim Crow analogy); Radley Balko, 
There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. 
POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-
police-evidence-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/KA4N-9LMM] (cataloging studies about 
racial bias in the criminal justice system); Katherine J. Rosich, Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice 
System, AM. SOCIO. ASS’N (Sept. 2007), https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/images/press/
docs/pdf/ASARaceCrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TT4-BFRP] (examining complex empirical evidence 
concerning the effects of race at individual stages of the criminal justice system, and discussing how 
certain studies find “direct or overt race discrimination in the criminal justice system,” while others 
indicate “race effects in specific situations, contexts, or jurisdictions—or find no race effects at all”). 
 7.  See generally Matiangai Sirleaf, Racing National Security: Introduction to the Just Security 
Symposium, JUST SEC. (July 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71373/racing-national-security-
introduction-to-the-just-security-symposium [https://perma.cc/D4XG-5MZX] (rendering race more 
visible in national security discourse, while also emphasizing racial justice over racial discrimination as 
an analytical framework). 
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Muslim Americans—through race-based policing and policies that foster 
government distrust.8 Finally and separately, other scholars critique the 
unequal manner in which ICC investigations and prosecutions fall upon 
African defendants,9 part of a broader reevaluation rooted in critical race 
theory and third-world approaches to international law.10 A common refrain 
amongst all these scholars is that certain ethnic, racial, and/or national 
communities are disproportionately prosecuted or otherwise impacted due to 
racism, pathological politics, or geopolitical opportunism. And yet, missing 
from these discourses is how such structural issues shape the United States 
as an actor in the transnational and international criminal justice systems. 
This Essay builds on this scholarship by exposing race at the heart of 
extraterritorial criminal law enforcement, where the U.S. executive branch 
operates with even more freedom than it does domestically. Part I describes 
the reckoning, in which othering across borders occurs in both U.S. 
transnational criminal prosecutions and international criminal legal 
policymaking. And Part II describes the reformation, calling for ICC 
engagement; realignment of institutional, bilateral, and multilateral 
incentives around bilateral relationships; and renewed efforts to address 
domestic criminal justice inequities. In so doing, this Essay will contribute 
to four scholarly conversations. First, it will add a cross-border dimension to 
ongoing scholarship regarding the nature and extent of the U.S. criminal 
 
 8.  See e.g., Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences 
of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without 
a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 611–15 (2005) (discussing the targeting of Arab and Muslim 
citizens and post-9/11 policy impacts); Lenese C. Herbert, Bête Noire: How Race-Based Policing 
Threatens National Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 156–58 (2003) (arguing that race-based policing 
threatens national security by sowing distrust); Towards the Closure of Guantanamo, INTER-AM. 
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/guantanamo/guantanamo.html 
[https://perma.cc/8F25-735B] (describing Guantanamo Bay as a “[d]iscriminatory regime . . . on the basis 
of [the prisoner’s] nationality, ethnicity, and religion”). 
 9.  See generally, e.g., Fatou Bensouda, Africa Question: Is the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Targeting Africa Inappropriately?, ICC F. (Mar. 2013), https://iccforum.com/africa 
[https://perma.cc/XPZ8-SL6J] (debating whether Africa is inappropriately targeted by the ICC); Mary 
Kimani, Pursuit of Justice or Western Plot?, UNITED NATIONS: AFRICA RENEWAL (Oct. 2009), 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2009/pursuit-justice-or-western-plot 
[https://perma.cc/KQR7-JCP6] (discussing the controversy concerning the ICC’s role in Africa); Maxine 
Rubin, Points of Tension Between African States and the International Criminal Court, SOC. SCI. RES. 
COUNCIL (Aug. 27, 2019), https://kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/2019/08/27/points-of-tension-between-african-
states-and-the-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/L5XN-HVUP] (same); Adam Taylor, Why 
So Many African Leaders Hate the International Criminal Court, WASH. POST (June 15, 2015, 2:11 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/15/why-so-many-african-leaders-hate-
the-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/9LDP-M2HS] (same). 
 10.  See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-
Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841, 845 (2000) (proposing that critical race theory be “deployed as part of 
the project for the reconstruction of international law”). 
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justice system’s disproportionate impact on communities of color.11 Second, 
it will contribute to ongoing foreign relations law discourse regarding race 
and citizenship in U.S. national security policy.12 Third, it will add to the 
growing scholarship on foreign affairs prosecutions,13 including their impact 
on defendants’ criminal procedural rights and U.S. foreign policy.14 And 
fourth, it will add a racial dimension to the scholarship on U.S. engagement 
with the ICC.15 
I. THE RECKONING: NEW FRONTS IN RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
Today, criminal justice exists along three tiers. The domestic tier is the 
most familiar: our U.S. system of federal, state, and local prosecutions. In 
our era of mass incarceration, scholars and practitioners alike criticize this 
system for its disproportionate impact on communities of color due to, inter 
alia, disparities in policing and prosecutorial practice.  
The international tier is the most macroscopic: a system of international 
criminal tribunals and investigative mechanisms that the international 
community has established. Today, the ICC—a permanent tribunal in The 
Hague with jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and aggression—best exemplifies this tier. In recent years, a persistent 
question has been how the United States negotiates its relationship with an 
international court that is an autonomous global actor, given that it—
alongside other large countries such as China, Russia, and India—is not a 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting 
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 470, 530–33 (2010) (describing measures taken by 
states to further study the ways in which collateral consequences of criminal conviction 
disproportionately burden communities of color). 
 12.  See generally Sinnar, supra note 5(challenging the international-domestic terrorism divide and 
describing its deleterious consequences for Muslims). 
 13.  See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340 (2019) 
[hereinafter Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions] (exploring both the promise and risks of foreign affairs 
prosecutions). 
 14.  See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, Core Criminal Procedure, 105 MINN. L. REV. 251 (2020) 
(arguing that the U.S. government treats some criminal procedural rights as “marginal and expendable” 
in the context of foreign affairs prosecutions); Steven Arrigg Koh, The Criminalization of Foreign 
Relations, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Koh, Criminalization] (on file with 
Author). 
 15.  See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The U.S. and the ICC: No More Excuses, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. 
L. REV. 563, 563–68 (2013) (scrutinizing excuses given for the United States’s failure to become party 
to the ICC’s founding treaty); David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 529, 531–32 (1999) (discussing the U.S. delegation’s objectives during negotiations 
of the Rome Treaty and its rationale for declining to support the final draft treaty); see also Mileno Sterio, 
The Trump Administration and the International Criminal Court: A Misguided New Policy, 51 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 201, 203–10 (2019) (criticizing the Trump administration’s policy towards the ICC as 
“misguided and detrimental to United States’ interests”).  
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party to the Rome Statute of the ICC.16 President Bill Clinton signed the 
Rome Statute but did not move for its ratification, the Bush administration 
passed the American Service-Members’ Protection Act,17 and the Obama 
administration engaged in a rapprochement that included a reaffirmation of 
the U.S. signature to the Rome Statute.18 Throughout, a common critique of 
the ICC was that it solely investigated and prosecuted atrocities in African 
countries—a prosecutorial strategy that the United States has at some points 
supported.19 Most recently, an African-led ICC began investigating U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan.20 
Finally, the middle, transnational tier foregrounds the “long arm” of the 
U.S. criminal justice system, which reaches abroad now more than ever 
before, due to rising cross-border, cyber, and international crime.21 
Previously, I have called such cases foreign affairs prosecutions, 
encompassing foreign apprehension, evidence gathering, and criminal 
conduct, as well as cases that implicate foreign nations’ criminal justice 
interests. In such cases, the executive branch engages its foreign affairs and 
prosecutorial authority at the same time, operating within a pre-existing 
framework of bilateral and multilateral treaties, extraterritorial statutes, 
amended federal criminal procedure, case law characterized by judicial 
deference, and globalized institutional capacity. Recent headlines of foreign 
 
 16. State Parties to the Rome Statute, ASSEMBLY OF STATE PARTIES, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%
20the%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/9ACN-FDV9]. This dynamic represents yet another 
chapter in the long history of U.S. engagement with international criminal tribunals, which oscillates 
between leadership and hostility. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 525 (2013) [hereinafter Koh, ICJ 5.0] (reviewing the United States’s role in the 
history of international criminal justice). 
 17.  American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002). 
The Act severely limits U.S. cooperation with the ICC. See David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The 
Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
983, 991 (2008). 
 18.  See Koh, ICJ 5.0, supra note 16, at 534–37 (describing the Obama administration’s efforts to 
increase engagement with the ICC). 
 19.  See Nerida Chazal, Beyond Borders?: The International Criminal Court and the Geopolitics of 
International Criminal Justice, 22 GRIFFITH L. REV. 707, 721 (2013); Shai Dothan, Deterring War 
Crimes, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 739, 744–45 (2015) (explaining that the ICC, as of 2015, had 
“investigated only eight situations, all of them in African countries”); Alexandra Huneeus, International 
Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 42 (2013); Mary Kimani, supra note 9; Alexandra Zavis & Robyn Dixon, Q&A: Only 
Africans Have Been Tried at the Court for the Worst Crimes on Earth, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016, 2:18 
PM), https://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-icc-africa-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/69XX-
MTV9]. 
 20.  Elian Peltier & Fatima Faizi, I.C.C. Allows Afghanistan War Crimes Inquiry To Proceed, 
Angering U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/world/europe/
afghanistan-war-crimes-icc.html [https://perma.cc/V89F-DYHY]. 
 21.  See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 352–58, 388. 
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affairs prosecutions22 include the indictment of Chinese nationals accused of 
stealing Covid-19 research;23 the incarceration of Mexican drug cartel 
leaders;24 and the extradition of Black Caribbean, Latin American, and 
European FIFA officials.25  
It is time to expand the academic discourse regarding race and U.S. 
criminal justice beyond our borders, focusing on the international and 
transnational tiers. A ripe contemporary question is: To what degree does 
race animate U.S. global criminal justice policy? We may answer this first 
by considering two case examples and then illuminating the structural factors 
that give rise to othering across borders. 
A. Two Case Examples 
Consider two simultaneous scenarios during the Trump administration. 
First, former President Donald Trump waged a multi-front confrontation 
with China, one tinged with racial animus. He and other conservative leaders 
referred to Covid-19 as the “Chinese Virus”26 or “Wuhan virus”27 or “kung 
flu,”28 despite many reports that such widely circulated references increased 
racial attacks against Asian Americans in 2020. Such anti-Asian sentiment 
has culminated most recently in the March 2021 Atlanta spa shootings.29 
 
 22.  See id. at 346–52. 
 23.  Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Accuses Hackers of Trying To Steal Coronavirus Vaccine Data for 
China, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/politics/china-hacking-
coronavirus-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/AL9W-2UYC]. 
 24.  Alan Feuer, El Chapo Found Guilty on All Counts; Faces Life in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/nyregion/el-chapo-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/DZB9-
E7DF]. 
 25.  Matt Apuzzo & Sam Borden, FIFA Charges Instantly Earn Loretta Lynch Global Recognition, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/sports/soccer/loretta-lynch-with-
assist-from-soccer-makes-strong-global-impression.html [https://perma.cc/UKY9-A847]; Evan Perez & 
Shimon Prokupecz, U.S. Charges 16 FIFA Officials in Widening Probe, CNN (Dec. 3, 2015, 6:02 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/03/sport/fifa-corruption-charges-justice-department/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J4CJ-9NLC]. 
 26.  Allyson Chiu, Trump Has No Qualms About Calling Coronavirus the ‘Chinese Virus.’ That’s 
a Dangerous Attitude, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2020, 7:22 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/20/coronavirus-trump-chinese-virus 
[https://perma.cc/UB5B-QG72]. 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Donald Trump Calls Covid-19 ‘Kung Flu’ at Tulsa Rally, GUARDIAN (June 20, 2020, 9:06 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/20/trump-covid-19-kung-flu-racist-language 
[https://perma.cc/29HT-G78D]. 
 29.  See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 26; Anna Purna Kambhampaty, ‘I Will Not Stand Silent.’ 10 Asian 
Americans Reflect on Racism During the Pandemic and the Need for Equality, TIME (June 25, 2020, 
6:32 AM), https://time.com/5858649/racism-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/5PLJ-YPB8]; Sabrina 
Tavernise & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Spit On, Yelled At, Attacked: Chinese-Americans Fear for Their 
Safety, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-
attacks.html [https://perma.cc/9D23-LEQC]; 8 Dead in Atlanta Spa Shootings, With Fears of Anti-Asian 
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Trump also railed against TikTok, the viral video app owned by ByteDance, 
a Chinese internet technology company, and publicly mused about 
intervening in the extradition of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou.30 
Many commentators have linked Trump’s anti-Asian racism—which 
included support for President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to intern 
Japanese Americans during World War II—with his Executive Orders 13769 
and 13780 restricting travel from certain majority Muslim countries.31 
Unaddressed, however, is the connection to the growing list of investigations 
and prosecutions against Chinese nationals, catalyzed by a “China Initiative” 
designed to “reflect[] the strategic priority of countering Chinese national 
security threats and reinforce[] the President’s overall national security 
strategy.”32 While the status of the China Initiative in the Biden 
administration remains to be seen, at the time of this writing, the head of the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) National Security Division and various U.S. 
attorneys still lead it.33 The multi-faceted initiative emphasizes trade secret 
theft cases, and involves proactive information sharing and threat 
identification with individual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (“USAOs”).34 The 
Initiative’s website currently reflects a staggering number of sixty-eight case 
examples.35 Cases against the Chinese include the alleged stealing of Covid-
19 vaccine research,36 computer hacking and economic cyberespionage 
 
Bias, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Mar. 26, 2021, 9:19 AM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/03/17/us/shooting-atlanta-acworth [https://perma.cc/4DWK-
BCJY]. 
 30.  See David E. Sanger & Julian E. Barnes, Is TikTok More of a Parenting Problem Than a 
Security Threat?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/us/politics/tiktok-
security-threat.html [https://perma.cc/6NUR-8N2E]; Andy Blatchford & Leah Nylen, Trump’s 
Comments About Deal Huawei Exec’s Arrest To Take Center Stage in Extradition Fight, POLITICO (last 
updated June 15, 2020, 11:55 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/15/trump-china-trade-deal-
huawei-executive-extradition-319642 [https://perma.cc/MUE7-RZPB]. 
 31. Duncan Williams & Gideon Yaffe, Trump’s Administration Says the Travel Ban Isn’t Like 
Japanese Internment. It Is., WASH. POST (May 16, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/16/trumps-administration-says-the-travel-
ban-isnt-like-japanese-internment-it-is [https://perma.cc/NRK3-T9LG]. 
 32.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S CHINA 
INITIATIVE AND A COMPILATION OF CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS SINCE 2018 (last updated Feb. 11, 
2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-
compilation-china-related [https://perma.cc/G7P2-LC6Z].  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. As will be discussed infra, this Essay’s claim is not that all sixty-eight of these cases are 
wholly motivated by race and thus illegitimate; indeed, U.S. criminal justice must be marshalled to some 
degree alongside other foreign policy modalities such as diplomacy and sanctions. See Koh, 
Criminalization supra note 14, at 23–24. However, othering across borders contributes to the decision to 
investigate and prosecute such cases; the critical and political economic lens described herein provides 
insight into this dynamic. 
 36.  See Barnes, supra note 23. 
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offenses against American companies by Chinese nationals,37 and numerous 
allegations of individuals charged with conspiring to act in the United States 
as illegal agents of the People’s Republic of China.38 Such cases are widely 
popular in America, in which 73% of the population views China 
unfavorably.39 
Second, the Trump administration marshaled unprecedented levels of 
punitive measures against an African-led ICC.40 Since 2018—the year 
Nigerian Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji assumed the ICC Presidency41—the Trump 
administration authorized myriad anti-ICC measures on the stated public 
ground of safeguarding U.S. and Israeli nationals from ICC investigation or 
prosecution.42 These measures included barring ICC officials from entering 
the United States, enjoining their property within the United States, and 
prosecuting them in the U.S. criminal justice system.43 Most recently, in 
 
 37.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Three Chinese Hackers Who Work at 
Internet Security Firm for Hacking Three Corporations for Commercial Advantage (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-three-chinese-hackers-who-work-internet-security-firm-
hacking-three-corporations [https://perma.cc/77TV-4SDZ].  
 38.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eight Individuals Charged With Conspiring To 
Act as Illegal Agents of the People’s Republic of China (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/eight-individuals-charged-conspiring-act-illegal-agents-people-s-
republic-china [https://perma.cc/8EPR-JVRT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hayward Resident 
Sentenced to Four Years for Acting as an Agent of the People’s Republic of China (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hayward-resident-sentenced-four-years-acting-agent-people-s-republic-
china [https://perma.cc/Y4CZ-AFXT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New York City Police 
Department Officer Charged with Acting as Illegal Agent of the People’s Republic of China (Sept. 21, 
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-city-police-department-officer-charged-acting-illegal-
agent-people-s-republic-china [https://perma.cc/GF5L-D3U9]. 
 39.  Laura Silver, Kat Devlin & Christine Huang, Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic 
Highs in Many Countries, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries [perma.cc/23TF-
DL75]. 
 40.  While the actions are nominally triggered by the prospect of the investigation and prosecution 
of U.S. servicemembers, this is not a new issue. The Bush administration, also motivated by this fear, 
concluded bilateral Article 98 agreements in order to procure immunity of U.S. troops from ICC 
jurisdiction. CLARE M. RIBANDO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33337, ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENTS AND 
SANCTIONS ON U.S. FOREIGN AID TO LATIN AMERICA 2 (2006). In the Trump administration, this same 
threat triggered a new response: individual sanctions levied against people of color leading the ICC.  
 41.  Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtStructure/
Pages/judge.aspx?name=Judge%20Chile%20Eboe-Osuji [https://perma.cc/78S3-RALL]. 
 42.  See Sterio, supra note 15, at 209; The Trump Administration Revokes the ICC Prosecutor’s 
U.S. Visa Shortly Before the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Declines To Authorize an Investigation into War 
Crimes in Afghanistan, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 625, 625–30 (2019); Alex Ward, Why the Trump 
Administration Is Sanctioning a Top International Court, VOX (June 12, 2020), 
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/12/21287798/trump-international-criminal-court-sanctions-explained 
[https://perma.cc/HU65-VY2S] (discussing how the sanctioning of ICC members was in part motivated 
by a desire to protect U.S. servicemembers and Israel). 
 43.  Id. In June 2020, in response to ICC investigations in Afghanistan, the Trump administration 
announced the imposition of sanctions and visa restrictions against ICC officials as part of an “important 
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September 2020, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the 
imposition of U.S. sanctions upon the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda (a Gambian national) and the Head of the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division, 
Phakiso Mochochoko (a Lesothan national).44 This sparked global outcry, 
with U.S. senators,45 ex-U.S. government officials,46 foreign ministers,47 and 
international actors criticizing such action.48 Notably, the United States 
 
first step in holding the ICC accountable for exceeding its mandate and violating the sovereignty of the 
United States.” Julian Borger, Trump Targets ICC with Sanctions After Court Opens War Crimes 
Investigation, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/jun/11/trump-icc-us-war-crimes-investigation-sanctions [https://perma.cc/X84U-CULS]. 
Then Attorney General William Barr also indicated that the DOJ had commenced domestic investigations 
into executives at the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor for “corruption and malfeasance.” Uzay Yasar 
Aysev, Can the International Criminal Court Hold the Trump Administration in Contempt?, JUST SEC. 
(July 30, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71498/can-the-international-criminal-court-hold-the-
trump-administration-in-contempt [https://perma.cc/2WNX-NHJ4]. 
 44.  Julian Borger, US Imposes Sanctions on Top International Criminal Court Officials, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/sep/02/us-sanctions-
international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda [https://perma.cc/RU3Y-DF2C]. 
 45.  Beth Van Schaack, A Test for the US Posture on the Int’l Criminal Court: “Safe Harbor” 
Licenses?, JUST SEC. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72305/a-test-for-the-us-posture-on-
the-intl-criminal-court-safe-harbor-licenses [https://perma.cc/P5AR-7JAT]. 
 46.  Daniel Fried, former State Department coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama 
administration, criticized the U.S. sanctions for “creat[ing] the reality, not just the impression, of the 
United States as a unilateralist bully with contempt for international law and norms.” Pranshu Verma, 
Trump’s Sanctions on International Court May Do Little Beyond Alienating Allies, N.Y. TIMES (last 
updated Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/18/world/europe/trump-sanctions-
international-criminal-court.html [https://perma.cc/HM45-YFQD]. Additionally, Eric Lorber, a former 
senior adviser to the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence in the Trump administration, 
denounced the U.S. sanctions as yet another example of the administration’s inability to strike a proper 
balance between “using sanctions in a way that protects national interests while ensuring buy-in from key 
partners.” Id. 
 47.  The top diplomat of the European Union condemned the actions of the United States as 
“unacceptable and unprecedented.” Id. Germany’s foreign minister also criticized the sanctions, referring 
to them as a “serious mistake.” Id.  
 48.  President O-Gon Kwon of the Assembly of State Parties, which is the legislative body that 
oversees the ICC’s management, spoke out against the “unprecedented” measures taken by the United 
States against the international organization. See UN Dismayed Over US Sanctions on Top International 
Criminal Court Officials, UN NEWS (Sept. 2, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1071572 
[https://perma.cc/2MQQ-DES7] (reporting that Kwon released a statement that he “deeply regret[ted] 
measures targeting Court officials, staff and their families”). Additionally, Richard Dicker, who serves as 
the international justice director of the Human Rights Watch, claimed that the U.S. sanctions were 
obstructive and perverse, in that they “persecute[d] those tasked with prosecuting international crimes.” 
Borger, supra note 44. Daniel Balson, advocacy director of the human-rights group Amnesty International 
USA, expressed concerns that “[t]he White House’s actions may dissuade survivors of human rights 
abuses from demanding justice, and create a chilling effect on those who would support their efforts.” Ian 
Talley & Courtney McBride, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on International Criminal Court Officials, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-imposes-sanctions-on-international-
criminal-court-officials-11599073486 [https://perma.cc/BG96-YDU4]. 
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spared from sanction Bensouda’s chef de cabinet and deputy, both of whom 
are Canadian.49  
B. Othering Across Borders 
These two examples highlight what I call othering across borders, in 
which political and prosecutorial actors target foreign defendants and 
international institutions in order to promote national solidarity and build 
domestic political capital. Othering across borders arises due to the structure 
of law enforcement and foreign affairs authority, which is accountable only 
to the domestic electorate. In other words, one way to view this transnational 
criminal dynamic is one of externalities. Just as a corporation has every 
incentive to externalize certain costs onto third parties,50 U.S. political actors 
similarly have incentives to externalize costs onto foreign defendants and 
international institutions to which they are not electorally accountable. And 
just as the structural racism of a domestic political system may pursue 
policies that advance White and male voices to the detriment of women and 
minorities, so may the institutional forces of U.S. extraterritorial law 
enforcement trend toward cases prosecuting foreigners, particularly those 
from countries seen as “other.” 
Othering across borders lies at the intersection of critical theory and 
political economy.51 Regarding the former, a country—and even more 
recently, a president—engaging in such “othering” domestically is even 
more likely to do so in U.S. criminal policy abroad.52 Regarding the latter, 
which in criminal law is often associated with the late Professor Bill Stuntz, 
 
 49.  Van Schaack, supra note 45.  
 50.  Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 627–28 (2011). 
 51.  By “critical theory” I mean the analytical framework of law as politics, and in particular, the 
ways in which race is constructed by and in American law. Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory, in 
THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 80, 88 (William A. 
Edmundson & Martin P. Golding eds., Blackwell Publishers, 2005). By “political economy” I mean the 
analytical framework focusing on how public officials and institutions only meet their legal obligations 
if it is in their (self-)interest to do so. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Economic Rationality in the Analysis of Legal 
Rules and Institutions, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, 
supra at 67, 70.  
 52.  As Professor Shirin Sinnar stated,  
History and social psychology suggest that the legal divide persists, at least in part, because it 
tracks deep-seated tendencies to distinguish between insiders and outsiders on racial and 
xenophobic terms. Because foreign or nonwhite people—and their ideas—have long been 
perceived as threatening, the harsher treatment of international terrorism accords with implicit 
beliefs. Historical patterns of “othering” also make it natural for the international category to 
expand to cover ethnic and racial minorities who are experienced as a threat, whether or not 
they have true international ties. 
Sinnar, supra note 5, at 1395. 
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the drive to prosecute and/or act “tough on crime”53 may be externalized on 
foreign defendants, who are not part of the same polity and are less likely to 
mobilize to hold politicians politically accountable. Similarly, U.S. actors 
may criticize or sanction foreign nations and foreign defendants in order to 
show themselves to be “pro-America” or “America First.” While this has 
long been an aspect of foreign relations, today, our prosecutorial system is 
more globalized than ever, meaning that the added gravity of criminal 
sanction may fortify such statements.  
Under President Trump, othering across borders reached its zenith. The 
former president has a long, pre-existing disdain for women and people of 
color, mixed with an open disregard for domestic criminal justice norms. He 
questioned President Barack Obama’s place of birth,54 threatened to “lock 
up” Hillary Clinton,55 designated citizens of another country as “rapists,”56 
derided Mexican-American judges,57 referred to other nations as “shithole 
countries,”58 suggested that congresswomen of color “go back” to other 
countries,59 and called for the execution of the Central Park Five.60 He also 
engaged in tremendous prosecutorial protectionism for his close associates, 
 
 53.  See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 509 (2001). 
 54.  Adam Serwer, Birtherism of a Nation, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/birtherism-and-trump/610978 
[https://perma.cc/7MGQ-QHL7]. 
 55.  Dan Roberts, Ben Jacobs & Sabrina Siddiqui, Donald Trump Threatens To Jail Hillary Clinton 
in Second Presidential Debate, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2016, 11:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/oct/10/debate-donald-trump-threatens-to-jail-hillary-clinton [https://perma.cc/7M7R-
MBR4]. 
 56.  Rupert Neate, Donald Trump Doubles Down on Mexico “Rapists” Comments Despite Outrage, 
GUARDIAN (July 2, 2015, 3:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/02/donald-trump-
racist-claims-mexico-rapes [https://perma.cc/B73K-UT5P]. 
 57.  Z. Byron Wolf, Trump’s Attacks on Judge Curiel Are Still Jarring To Read, CNN (Feb. 27, 
2018, 8:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/politics/judge-curiel-trump-border-wall/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/C9HK-NM4Q]. 
 58.  See Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from “Shithole” Countries, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018, 7:52 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-
protections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-
11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html [https://perma.cc/H83K-VLHM]; Rupert Neate & Jo Tuckman, 
Donald Trump: Mexican Migrants Bring “Tremendous Infectious Disease” to US, GUARDIAN (July 6, 
2015, 6:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-
tremendous-infectious-disease [https://perma.cc/Z2S6-ND25]; Roberts, Jacobs & Siddiqui, supra note 
55. 
 59.  Bianca Quilantan & David Cohen, Trump Tells Dem Congresswomen: Go Back Where You 
Came From, POLITICO (July 14, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/14/trump-
congress-go-back-where-they-came-from-1415692 [https://perma.cc/8NV6-RHZY]. 
 60.  Jan Ransom, Trump Will Not Apologize for Calling for Death Penalty Over Central Park Five, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/nyregion/central-park-five-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/L49P-ZD6B]. 
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all of the same gender and race: he intervened in Michael Flynn61 and Roger 
Stone’s cases, not to mention those of Navy SEALs accused of war crimes.62 
In each case, President Trump circumvented or short-circuited the typical 
criminal process. Given such conceptions, it is no surprise that the president 
and his administration mixed this racism, sexism, xenophobia, and disregard 
for criminal justice norms in its transnational and international criminal legal 
policies, applying all to foreign nationals and international institutions led by 
Africans. This then emboldened his administration to again signal solidarity 
and nostalgia under the banners of “America First” and “Make America 
Great Again.” 
But it would be too simplistic to isolate these racial dynamics within 
the Trump White House alone. The vast majority of transnational criminal 
cases play out apart from the president. As noted recently in President 
Obama’s Harvard Law Review article, in practice, DOJ autonomy from 
direct White House control has long been the norm.63 On the front end, there 
is a long-standing norm against the president ordering prosecutions, thus 
reducing the risk of politicized prosecutions.64 On the back end, a norm 
prohibits the president from ordering the cessation of an investigation or 
 
 61.  Adam Goldman & Katie Benner, U.S. Drops Michael Flynn Case, in Move Backed by Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/us/politics/michael-flynn-case-
dropped.html [https://perma.cc/Z8TS-ULNX]. 
 62.  Helene Cooper, Maggie Haberman & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Trump Says He Intervened in 
War Crimes Cases To Protect “Warriors,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/us/politics/mark-esper-seal-navy-secretary.html 
[https://perma.cc/9TSL-5PH6]; Dave Philipps, Trump Reverses Navy Decision To Oust Edward 
Gallagher from SEALs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/us/trump-
seals-eddie-gallagher.html [https://perma.cc/8XAQ-A49L]. 
 63.  Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 811, 823 (2017) (“[W]ithin the executive branch, the President’s direct influence is subject to 
constraints designed to safeguard the fair enforcement of the law.”). Attorney general nominees since 
Watergate have also endorsed this autonomy principle. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the 
President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2018). White House priorities do 
enter the DOJ when the president installs political appointees to lead USAOs and the Main Justice 
Criminal Division, but many DOJ institutional priorities persist across administrations. And in any event, 
once such leadership is installed, the White House does not direct the DOJ on how to proceed in individual 
cases. 
 64.  Former President Barack Obama remarked, 
For good reason, particular criminal matters are not directed by the President personally but 
are handled by career prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving 
the public and promoting public safety. The President does not and should not decide who or 
what to investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen. 
Obama, supra note 63, at 823; see also Green & Roiphe, supra note 63, at 16 (“But, presidents do not, as 
a general matter, tell the FBI when to initiate or terminate particular investigations. Nor do they direct 
federal prosecutors whether charges against an individual should be presented to the grand jury or how 
pending charges should be prosecuted.”).  
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prosecution, for similar reasons.65 DOJ is also tremendously decentralized, 
given that ninety-three USAOs around the country—separate from one 
another and from Main Justice in Washington, D.C.—decide how and 
whether to prosecute.66 In the vast majority of cases, USAOs make 
independent decisions regarding which cases to investigate and prosecute, 
without Main Justice’s clearance.67 Such localized discretion has been made 
possible, in part, by the steady growth of the federal caseload.68 In such cases, 
targeting foreigners, including foreigners from less powerful states and/or of 
color, appears more available and even more desirable than pursuing cases 
domestically. Such critique is prominent with regard to Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”) cases, for example. Since 1997, all FCPA 
prosecutions have concerned extraterritorial conduct like foreign bribery and 
often targeted non-U.S. nationals.69 Such global allegations have, for 
instance, sparked best-selling book sales in China of The American Trap, a 
sensationalized account of FCPA prosecutions written by a convicted French 
corporate executive.70 
 
 65.  For example, as noted above, Trump said he would intervene with Meng, then his 
administration walked it back. Demetri Sevastopulo & David da Silva, Donald Trump Willing To 
Intervene in Huawei CFO Arrest Case, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/f82176a2-fda8-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521 [https://perma.cc/J53C-LVCS].  
 66.  Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 385–86. Indeed, prosecution of Chinese 
hackers has been ongoing since the Obama administration, which tried to broker a détente in such actions 
with a diplomatic summit on intellectual property, albeit one that ultimately only slowed, not stopped, 
such theft. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for 
Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantages (May 
19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-
against-us-corporations-and-labor [https://perma.cc/JJT7-4YRA]; Jack Goldsmith & Robert D. Williams, 
The Chinese Hacking Indictments and the Frail “Norm” Against Commercial Espionage, LAWFARE 
(Nov. 30, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinese-hacking-indictments-and-frail-norm-
against-commercial-espionage [https://perma.cc/8VNB-9NJC]. 
 67.  Main Justice in DOJ maintains the authority to exclusively prosecute, review, and/or coordinate 
with USAOs regarding certain offenses, such as capital cases and foreign corrupt practices. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL § 9-10.040 (2020) (“Prior to seeking an indictment for an 
offense potentially punishable by death, the United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General shall 
consult with the Capital Case Section.”); Id. § 9-47.110 (“Unless otherwise agreed upon by the AAG, 
Criminal Division, investigations and prosecutions of alleged violations of the antibribery provisions of 
the FCPA will be conducted by Trial Attorneys of the Fraud Section.”). 
 68.  Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 369, 406 (2009). 
 69.  Stanford L. Sch., DOJ and SEC Enforcement Actions per Year, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACS. ACT 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.html?tab=1 [https://perma.cc/EQ5N-
8CQ6] (select “Foreign and Domestic Entities Charged per Year”); Stanford L. Sch., Location of 
Misconduct Alleged in FCPA-Related Enforcement Actions (by Country), FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACS. 
ACT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.html?tab=8 [https://perma.cc/B9RT-
XW3H]. 
 70.  Adam Taylor & Liu Yang, An Unlikely Winner in the China-U.S. Trade War? A French 
Businessman’s Book About His Battle with the DOJ, WASH. POST (June 8, 2019, 4:23 PM), 
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Some of the most vivid examples of foreign targeting concern Mexico, 
a country that the United States has a long history of othering. Consider the 
infamous United States v. Alvarez-Machain case, in which the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) kidnapped from Mexico a Mexican 
national alleged to have participated in the torture and killing of a DEA 
agent.71 The case led to Supreme Court litigation on the question of whether 
such kidnapping contravened the U.S.–Mexico extradition treaty.72 In the 
end, such an egregious extraterritorial law enforcement tactic resulted in the 
acquittal of Alvarez-Machain himself.73 Another example is U.S. law 
enforcement activity regarding consular relations and Mexico. As is well 
known, in several high-profile cases,74 the United States conferred 
“respectful consideration” but, ultimately, disregarded the International 
Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”) decision regarding the proper interpretation of 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”), 
which mandates that receiving states must notify foreign nationals upon 
arrest of their right to contact their national consul.75 Such actions 
perpetuated Mexican nationals’ execution, undermined the legitimacy of the 
ICJ, and fragmented the interpretation and application of the VCCR.76 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/06/07/an-unlikely-winner-china-us-trade-war-french-
businessmans-book-about-his-battle-with-doj [https://perma.cc/P5TT-PNRA]. The book details how 
Frédéric Pierucci, the former senior executive of French multinational Alstom SA, was arrested, 
prosecuted, and incarcerated in the United States for FCPA violations. See generally FRÉDÉRIC PIERUCCI, 
THE AMERICAN TRAP: MY BATTLE TO EXPOSE AMERICA’S SECRET ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE REST 
OF THE WORLD (2019). In Pierucci’s conception, FCPA prosecutions are nothing other than an arm of 
American power, designed to incapacitate foreign companies competing with U.S. companies. Id. 
 71.  United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992). 
 72.  Id. at 658. The Court held that such action did not contravene the treaty, over a strenuous dissent 
from Justice John Paul Stevens and widespread global condemnation. See id. at 666, 668–70; id. at 670–
71 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 341, 373–74, 388.  
 73.  Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 74.  See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 n.9 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 
331, 382–83 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).  
 75.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261. For more information on the ICJ’s interpretation of art. 36, see Avena and Other Mexican Nationals 
(Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 43, 71 (Mar. 31); see also Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Application of the Republic of Paraguay, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 (Apr. 3, 1998), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/99/7183.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3DL-GHAQ] ) 
(petitioning the ICJ to determine whether the United States had failed to comply with its obligations to 
Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national, and Paraguay under VCCR; however, Paraguay rescinded its case 
prior to the ICJ issuing a ruling on the matter); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 472–73, ¶ 
11 (June 27) (filing in the ICJ by Germany against the United States, alleging that the United States had 
failed to notify two German nationals of their right to have German consular officials contacted following 
their arrests). 
 76.  See Steven Arrigg Koh, Note, “Respectful Consideration” After Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: 
Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the International Court of Justice, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 243, 250–
73 (2007). 
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II. THE REFORMATION 
How might we address the pernicious complexities of race and cross-
border criminal justice? To move from reckoning to reformation, we must 
reconcile the promise of cross-border criminal justice—the overarching goal 
of criminal accountability—alongside its stakes—the risk to defendants, 
foreign policy, and the international legal system. This opens the door to 
necessary transnational and international criminal legal reforms. 
A. The Promise and the Stakes 
Let us first situate suggested reform in the proper context: 
extraterritorial law enforcement is undoubtedly inevitable and necessary. 
Cross-border, cyber, and international crime are growing twenty-first-
century concerns,77 and the United States has an obvious interest in ensuring 
that members of its armed forces are not wrongly prosecuted for crimes. For 
example, the aforementioned China Initiative is driven to some degree by 
othering across borders, but it is also responding to a legitimate national 
security threat, to which criminal justice must play some role alongside other 
foreign policy modalities such as diplomacy, state-to-state agreements, and 
sanctions.78 Likewise, international criminal justice’s central aim is to 
promote accountability for such human conduct on a global dimension.79  
The specter in both tiers of criminal justice is that of “impunity gaps,” 
wherein individuals commit serious crimes but take advantage of national 
borders and/or ineffective criminal justice systems to avoid accountability 
for such crimes.80 So any reforms addressing race in criminal justice—such 
as, for example, the malleable norm of DOJ autonomy,81 the breadth of 
American prosecutorial discretion,82 and the reluctance of many prosecutors 
to “go after their own”83—may tug at deeply-embedded norms in our U.S. 
criminal justice system’s structure, risking other unintended consequences. 
 
 77.  See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 352–58. 
 78.  See Koh, Criminalization, supra note 14, at 5–12 (describing the use of such modalities in the 
context of the China Initiative). 
 79.  See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 352. 
 80.  See id. at 352–55, 359–61. 
 81.  See Green & Roiphe, supra note 63, at 64. 
 82.  See Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 176–82 (2019); William 
T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative 
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1332–33 (1993). 
 83.  See, e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO 
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES xvii, 31, 87 (2017) (asserting that the shifts in the political landscape, courts, 
the defense bar, and the DOJ have collectively undermined the power and persistence of U.S. prosecutors 
to go after corporations and their executives). 
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Similarly, justified ICC criticism need not necessitate throwing out the 
baby with the bathwater. While racial complexities pervade the entire ICL 
project, such dynamics do not warrant its wholesale abandonment. The best 
example of such subtlety regards Africa: Do we center our critique around 
neglect of African victims or disproportionate targeting of African 
defendants? Regarding the former, in the 1990s, many criticized the 
international community for turning a blind eye to atrocities in Africa while 
establishing an international tribunal to prosecute international crimes 
against White Europeans in Yugoslavia.84 Such criticism led to the 
establishment of the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
1994.85 Now, the standard critique is that the ICC is too focused on Africa, 
disproportionately prosecuting African defendants and neglecting other parts 
of the world. So which is it? The subtle answer is “both,” given that race may 
both foster African victims’ neglect but also perpetuate an over-emphasis on 
African prosecutions due to geopolitical opportunism. ICC prosecutorial 
actors are disincentivized from investigating and prosecuting powerful 
countries, given the authority such states enjoy globally. There will be more 
institutional and political costs to prosecuting the United Kingdom for war 
crimes than prosecuting Kenya. The racial makeup of these countries is of 
course intertwined with this geopolitical reality. 
But this reality does not obscure that some individual Africans are truly 
perpetrating international crime against African victims, nor that 
international tribunals can promote accountability for such injustices. 
Dismissing such projects as neo-colonial is thus too facile. The conflict in 
Darfur, for example, has rightly been described as a genocide, and the ICC 
has indicted Omar al-Bashir on that charge.86 This indictment is desirable: 
beginning in 2003, al-Bashir’s Arab Sudanese government perpetrated 
genocide against Black Sudanese, with some estimates of 300,000 deaths 
 
 84.  Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 167, 175–78 (1997). 
 85.  See id. at 168 n.3, 176–78. 
 86.  The ICC has since suspended activities on this case. Marlise Simons, Sudan: Prosecutor Halts 
Darfur Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/13/world/africa/sudan-
prosecutor-halts-darfur-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/R9QE-3RBA]. However, on June 10, 2020, ICC 
prosecutor Fatou Bensouda implored the Security Council and the broader international community to 
urge Sudan to increase its efforts in bringing Darfur war crimes suspects to justice. Press Release, U.N. 
Sec. Counsel, Securing Justice for Past Crimes in Darfur Must Remain Sudan’s Priority, International 
Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells Security Council (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14210.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/R7VU-PRNF]. Bensouda’s 
statements followed the June 3 transfer of Ali Kushayb into ICC custody in the Central African 
Republic—a promising development in the ICC’s plans to achieve justice for Darfur victims. Id. (“Justice 
for Darfur has already been too elusive for too long . . . . It is past time for that unsatisfactory state of 
affairs to change. A window of opportunity has been reopened. We must collectively seize it.”). 
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and 2.7 million Darfurians displaced.87 This case thus highlights the ongoing 
challenge of promoting accountability, mindful of the pernicious effects of 
racism on all sides of such a criminal process. 
And yet othering across borders disrupts and corrodes these 
transnational and international criminal legal systems on three fronts. The 
first is the impact on foreign defendants, who are often both of color and 
foreign nationals.88 Such defendants litigate in an unfamiliar system and 
(almost always) a foreign language. For them, the U.S. criminal process is 
unintuitive, and they are forced to retain counsel in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Jurors are also more inclined to rule against them, given the defendants 
almost always do not hail from the jurors’ community. Additionally, these 
defendants may find themselves defending against not one but multiple 
sovereigns, each of which has shared evidence or otherwise contributed to 
the criminal case. 
Second, othering across borders regrettably reverberates in foreign 
relations. Foreign countries may avail themselves of several options. They 
may protest through diplomatic channels; this occurred, for example, 
between Presidents Obama and François Hollande in the BNP Paribas case.89 
They may also use other instrumentalities of foreign policy, including 
cooperation and association agreements, trade, economic sanctions, military 
force, and the use of foreign aid.90 And they may weaponize their own 
criminal justice system, in a sort of global arrest game, in which retaliatory 
 
 87.  At Five-Year Mark, Darfur Crisis Is Only Worsening - UN Aid Chief, UN NEWS (Apr. 22, 
2008), https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/04/256942-five-year-mark-darfur-crisis-only-worsening-un-
aid-chief [https://perma.cc/DSP3-L2PJ]. In June 2020, fugitive and former militia leader Ali Kosheib 
turned himself in to the ICC, thus becoming the first individual to likely be tried by the Court. Press 
Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Situation in Darfur (Sudan): Ali Kushayb is in ICC Custody (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1525 [https://perma.cc/P8UW-2GR4]; ICC: 
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HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 9, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/09/icc-sudanese-fugitive-custody 
[https://perma.cc/42J7-WJQ2]. It is a welcome development: by any measure, this is indeed a “crime of 
most serious concern to the international community” and thus a call to the promotion of criminal 
accountability. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. 
 88.  See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 362–85. 
 89.  Karen Freifeld & Yann Le Guernigou, Obama Deflects French Pressure To Intervene in BNP 
Dispute, REUTERS (June 5, 2014, 6:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnpparibas-usa/obama-
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[https://perma.cc/MDA6-PU77]. At a dinner between Presidents Obama and Hollande, Obama rejected 
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 90.  See Clair Apodaca, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS *2 (Apr. 26, 2017), https://oxfordre.com/politics/
view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332 [https://perma.cc/
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arrests and prosecutions occur as part of a worldwide system of criminal 
prosecution.91 Just recently, for example, the Chinese government warned 
that it may detain U.S. citizens as retaliation for U.S. prosecution of Chinese 
scholars in U.S. territory; the U.S. State Department issued a related travel 
advisory recommending that Americans avoid visiting China, in part because 
the Chinese government detains foreign nationals “to gain bargaining 
leverage over foreign governments.”92 
Third, this racial valence corrodes the international legal system and 
further undermines American leadership in international law. International 
law may promote global cooperation, while othering may foster nationalism, 
racism, and xenophobia. With ICL specifically, such nationalism disrupts the 
broader goal of fostering international criminal accountability. From its 
earliest days in Nuremberg until today, ICL has promised to promote 
accountability for the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community, namely, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
The gravity of such crimes should transcend national boundaries. And 
whatever criticisms of the ICC’s structure and jurisdiction (and many valid 
ones exist), it is a gross perversion of U.S. policy to weaponize U.S. 
sanctions to target ICC actors. 
B. The Way Forward 
Like many issues at the intersection of race and law, othering across 
borders defies any simple solution.93 And yet, the following measures may 
help curb such forces in U.S. criminal justice policy at the international, 
transnational, and domestic levels. 
First, regarding U.S. engagement internationally, it is far preferable for 
the United States to work constructively with the ICC than to antagonize it. 
One opportunity for the Biden administration is to reengage with the ICC as 
the Obama administration did, including ceasing hostile rhetoric towards the 
 
 91.  See Koh, Criminalization, supra note 14, at 17; see also Steven Arrigg Koh, Criminalizing 
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to Prosecutions of Chinese Scholars, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2020, 3:37 PM), 
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 93.  See e.g., TEHRANIAN, supra note 2, at 165 (listing a wide variety of reforms in law, media, and 
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ICC, engaging with the Assembly of States Parties and the ICC, publicly 
supporting and advocating for cooperation with the ICC, urging foreign 
nations to refrain from assisting those individuals that are at large and 
currently under investigation by the ICC, and encouraging foreign states to 
contribute resources and logistical assistance to help the ICC detain current 
fugitives.94 The greater the cooperation, the more the United States and the 
ICC will have similar goals around similar defendants.95 In particular, 
concerning the Afghanistan investigation, the United States should be 
mindful that charges are unlikely, as emphasized recently by retired General 
Wesley Clark.96 At the extreme, the United States could strip the ICC of the 
ability to hear any case by showing itself to be willing and able to investigate 
or prosecute.97 One initial hopeful sign is the Biden administration’s 
announcement in April 2021 that it is dropping sanctions against Bensouda 
and others.98 
Transnationally, keeping with the political economy lens, U.S. political, 
prosecutorial, and institutional actors should internalize some of the costs of 
prosecutions against foreign defendants, disincentivizing the exploitation of 
foreign affairs prosecutions to promote domestic solidarity. One way is to 
further integrate the DOJ and the Department of State under the National 
Security Council’s umbrella of inter-agency coordination.99 DOJ will better 
apprehend the geopolitical consequences of its actions without falling 
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Assange and Omar al-Bashir: What Comes Next for Two Global Fugitives?, JUST SEC. (Apr. 12, 2019) 
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directly under White House direction on questions of criminal investigation 
and prosecution.100 It may also give the United States greater incentive to 
pursue diplomatic and legal solutions to such problems. For example, as 
noted above, the United States initially pursued diplomatic negotiations with 
China regarding intellectual property theft; while in this specific case the 
strategy was unsuccessful, as a general rule this is a positive proposition. The 
United States may also marshal international law to broker bilateral and 
multilateral law enforcement agreements. This creates a quid pro quo 
relationship, wherein countries have a mutual incentive to engage 
judiciously in law enforcement activity to preserve their broader law 
enforcement dynamic.101 The recent history of bilateral treaties regarding the 
exchange of evidence exemplifies this trend.102 While such agreements have 
drawbacks—including perennial international legal questions of compliance 
and enforcement—such an approach has many benefits over the ICC model, 
wherein a national government has an incentive to “other” an international 
court prosecuting its own nationals.103 
When foreign defendants of color are prosecuted domestically, the 
necessary prescriptions resemble those already identified as sorely necessary 
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in domestic criminal justice. The need for reform of indigent defense,104 plea 
bargaining,105 and juries adjudicating minority defendants106 all apply 
equally to the global criminal justice space as well. In this sense, the 
problematic racial questions arising in global criminal justice inhere in the 
very nature of U.S. criminal justice itself—particularly the disproportionate 
impact of the system on defendants of color. Thus, all reforms must continue 
to be situated in a deeper understanding of the function of racial 
subordination at the intersection of U.S. law, policy, and culture.  
CONCLUSION 
Our moment of reckoning for criminal justice does not stop at our 
borders. We must account for the realities of racism as a matter of domestic 
criminal law enforcement and in our broader transnational and international 
criminal systems. Today, U.S. criminal justice may other across borders, 
leading to overzealous foreign affairs prosecutions and the sanctioning of 
ICC officials. This then harms foreign defendants, complicates U.S. foreign 
relations, and fragments international law. While the persistent questions of 
race and law are not easily resolved, we may begin the process of reformation 
through ICC engagement; realignment of institutional, bilateral, and 
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multilateral incentives around bilateral relationships; and renewed efforts to 
address domestic criminal justice inequities. 
 
